To Command the Sky: HIGHLY recommended!!!

[Bearfoot]

Folks,

Hello all!

I've been flying a lot of DCS choppers for a while now, but am just recently starting to get into one of my childhood loves, i.e. WW2 combat aviation!

Having a blast!

I thought I would like to share a book I read a while back that I have not seen discussed very much (but maybe that is because I have only recently started with this community?):

To Command the Sky: The Battle for Air Superiority Over Germany, 1942-1944
https://www.amazon.com/Command-Sky-Superiority-Smithsonian-Spaceflight/dp/0817353461

Incredible book!

If Len Deighton's "Fighter" is the definitive account of the BoB, then this must be the one the air war over the Reich.

Some remarkable history of how the concept of "bomber" and "fighter" (or "pursuit" as it was originally called, hence the initial range of US fighter aircraft being designated with the "P" prefix, e.g., "P-40") evolved dramatically, with empirical facts fighting a dogged battle with entrenched interwar ideology. There was this "bomber" school on both sides, strongly informed by an Italian scholar's worldview, which saw the bomber as the only aircraft that would serve any real purpose in wartime: "the bomber will always get through", and a sort of local air superiority would be projected by the bomber itself to ensure it saw its mission through.

For me, though, the biggest revelation was how the Allied strategic bomber offensive toward the latter part of the war had only as its secondary objective the attack on 3rd Reich infrastructure; the primary objective was to draw up the Luftwaffe fighters into combat so that they could be destroyed by Allied escort fighters, and by this way of attrition degrade the Axis air power sufficiently to guarantee the total Allied dominance of the air during the D-Day invasion of Europe.

In other words, the bombers were just bait.

This is a totally new perspective for me!

And I imagine, must have been for most bomber crews reading about it after the war!

Worst of all of, though, must have been the British bomber crews. They not only suffered horrendous losses, but they inflicted horrendous damage on a civilian population for absolute no material gains at all except to give the feeling that Britian was "doing something to hit back" during the years before the invasion (while the daytime raids drew up the Luftwaffe fighters to be attrited, thus saving Allied lives on D-Day, the nightfighters were a sideshow, with the only effect being to draw away and tie down a relatively small number of good pilots, fuel and aircraft resources). Britain called, and the bomber crews answered, many with their lives, but what a horrible mismanagement of resources!

Besides that, though, the grand Allied strategy to dismantle the Luftwaffe fighter corps through a war of attrition by forcing them into combat to defend the Reich against the daytime bombers was brilliantly conceived and a brilliant success.
Of course, a major factor contributing to the success of the plan was how the strangulation of resources flowing into the Reich, especially aviation fuel, cut away at the hamstrings of Luftwafe, eating into not just operations, but far more cruicially, training (rather: operations were prioritized over training, which resulted in dramatic decline in pilot quality, especially as, since there were no rotations, veteran pilots fought until they died or the war was lost).

Either way, it's an amazing story, full of detail of every aspect of the air operations, from nuts and bolts of how the defenses of the Reich were organized, both strategically and tactically, to how the raids were conducted. The discussion of how allied doctrine, though awfully crippled by the "bomber" school (and plagued by this right to the end) was nonethless allowed to evolve in the face of the facts, and this was an important factor for the allied success. Really puts things into perspective on how revolutionary the P-51 was -- it was not that it was all that great of an aircraft (though Luftwaffe pilots respected it healthily, especially over 20K ft), but it was able to escort the bombers into the heart of the Reich and then destroy the fighters lured into the air after them. Other interesting stuff: how lack of bad weather flying training was critical weakness in the Luftwaffe etc.

It might be an exaggeration to say that D-Day was won by the Allies before the first boot landed on the beaches, due to the war in the air over Europe in the preceding four years. But certainly D-Day was not lost by the Allies because of that air war.

[ATAG_((dB))]

Thank you for this review, I just put it in the basket. :thumbsup:

[RAF74_Buzzsaw]

Len Deighton's 'Fighter' is not the definitive account of the BoB... it's actually a mediocore book, full of misinformation.

Regarding the USAAF aims... destroying the Luftwaffe Fighter force was one part of the overall campaign, but the bombing directed at oil, transportation, and other specialized industries also had a heavy effect on the German war effort. The loss of oil production was key to the German inability to compete on the fast moving modern battlefield... by the end of the war there was a chronic shortage of fuel in all areas of the German Armed Forces... land, sea, air. New pilots couldn't be trained properly because there was a shortage of fuel... it had to be reserved for combat missions. When the Wehrmacht attacked in the Ardennes, they did not have enough fuel to reach their objectives... they gambled on capturing US fuel dumps... and when they failed to do this, the offensive ground to a halt.

Re. the British bomber campaign, it is incorrect to suggest it accomplished nothing... while the targeting was often wasted on general bombing, the RAF did selectively hit targets quite regularly and when they did, their bombing was more effective than the USAAF. The RAF used much larger bombs, and only these very large types could destroy machine tools and heavy equipment, the USAAF primarily used 500 lb types and these typically just destroyed the buildings, not the heavy equipment. So when the rubble was cleared away, the equipment could be used again. Speer noted after the war how effective the RAF raids were when they were focused.

And of course, the British, who started their campaign a long time before the US, and who were flying 1000 plane raids in 1942, also required the Nazi regime to divert huge numbers of resources towards air defense. Nearly two million Germans were involved in the air defense infrastructure... large numbers of them could have been fighting on the front lines instead. The resources which went to building twin engined night fighters could have been used to build attack planes. Nearly 1/3 of the artillery pieces produced in the war were heavy AAA, the resources used to build these could have been used to build conventional artillery, which would have made the Germans much more able to compete with the Allies on the battlefield.

[Bearfoot]

Len Deighton's 'Fighter' is not the definitive account of the BoB... it's actually a mediocore book, full of misinformation.

Interesting. Care to discuss further? What references would you recommend?


Regarding the USAAF aims... destroying the Luftwaffe Fighter force was one part of the overall campaign, but the bombing directed at oil, transportation, and other specialized industries also had a heavy effect on the German war effort. The loss of oil production was key to the German inability to compete on the fast moving modern battlefield... by the end of the war there was a chronic shortage of fuel in all areas of the German Armed Forces... land, sea, air. New pilots couldn't be trained properly because there was a shortage of fuel... it had to be reserved for combat missions. When the Wehrmacht attacked in the Ardennes, they did not have enough fuel to reach their objectives... they gambled on capturing US fuel dumps... and when they failed to do this, the offensive ground to a halt.

My brief summary was, indeed, a brief summary, blanketing over a lot of nuance and complexity in the book. But even so, I think you are responding to a very false reductionist reading of a brief summary ;) . The operative words here are "primary" vs. "secondary". If something is a "secondary" objective, it does not mean it does not have an effect or even that the effect is minor or non-significant. The key point here is that, halfway through the war, contrary to previously prevailing ideology and doctrine, destruction of infrastructure and resources become a secondary objective, and the primary objective of the bomber campaign become the attrition of the Luftwaffe fighter force through forcing them up in the air to fight.

My summary specifically mentions fuel shortages as a major issue through the war, and the book goes into great detail into the effects of this not just on the air war but the war in general. Neither my summary nor the book says this is of no consequence or had no effect. I specifically mention its effect, in fact!

So, in general I completely agree with all your points! They are entirely correct! Unfortunately, the points to which they seem to be in response to are phantoms .... :)



Re. the British bomber campaign, it is incorrect to suggest it accomplished nothing... while the targeting was often wasted on general bombing, the RAF did selectively hit targets quite regularly and when they did, their bombing was more effective than the USAAF. The RAF used much larger bombs, and only these very large types could destroy machine tools and heavy equipment, the USAAF primarily used 500 lb types and these typically just destroyed the buildings, not the heavy equipment. So when the rubble was cleared away, the equipment could be used again. Speer noted after the war how effective the RAF raids were when they were focused.

And of course, the British, who started their campaign a long time before the US, and who were flying 1000 plane raids in 1942, also required the Nazi regime to divert huge numbers of resources towards air defense. Nearly two million Germans were involved in the air defense infrastructure... large numbers of them could have been fighting on the front lines instead. The resources which went to building twin engined night fighters could have been used to build attack planes. Nearly 1/3 of the artillery pieces produced in the war were heavy AAA, the resources used to build these could have been used to build conventional artillery, which would have made the Germans much more able to compete with the Allies on the battlefield.

Yes, "accomplishing nothing" is false or, at the very least exaggeratedly reductionist. I do mention tying up resources, but if we take that route than the night bomber campaign was a very, very, very, expensive way to go about it, as measured in both allied lives or civilian casualties. The effectiveness of the strategic bombing is a huge debate entirely beyond the scope of this thread, and certainly arguments can and will be made for many sides, but it is fact that 3rd Reich production actually peaked at the height of the campaign. As the book that is the focus of the thread points out, that does not mean the bomber campaign had no effect, as production levels would have been even higher if it were not for them. It just means that the strategic bomber campaign simply did not have quite the popularly-imagined effect and that if infrastructure destruction was the primary objective of the air war campaign than the campaign must be deemed at best a weak sideshow. But as openly acknowledged in reams of publications and interviews, halfway through the war the *primary* objective was deliberately and explicitly changed from infrastructure destruction to luring the Luftwaffe force up in the air to be destroyed. Infrastructure destruction remained an objective, but a secondary objective to the destruction of the fighter force. This was not just a philosophical outlook, but percolated into nuts-and-bolts operations: e.g., ingress paths did NOT try to avoid fighter opposition; on the contrary, bombers were routed directly into the path of German defense air bases.

As far as the British night bomber campaign: it was specifically mentioned that as the attrition of the night fighter force did not contribute very much to the destruction of the day fighter force, and the latter was a crucial objective that needed to be achieved before the invasion of Europe, the British night bomber campaign did, indeed, retain infrastructure destruction as a primary objective. But while it had its successes in this regard, in relation to the destruction of non-strategic value (including civilian), it was arguable if this was an efficient way to go about it, even at the time. More to the point, contra to pre-war doctrine and hopes and wishful thing, it was recognized that the 3rd Reich was not going to be defeated or even seriously degraded by a strategic campaign, and if the Allies wanted to win the war they were going to have to destroy the Luftwaffe fighters and get boots on the ground. This is the argument made in the book, not mine!

Furthermore, regarding the effectiveness of the British nightbomber campaign, while only peripherally mentioned in the book, my impression is that, patriotism and propaganda to the contrary, it has been widely acknowledged for the last few decades that this was really much more about "spiritual" (or morale) rather than material gains. In fact, there are some pithy quotes from Bomber Harris himself to that effect, no?

[RAF74_Buzzsaw]

Hello Bearfoot

To mention one of many errors in Deighton: He suggests the 109 could outturn the Hurricane and Spit... Deighton was a populist writer... and he didn't do his research.

On to the other subjects:

Have you read the USAAF's "Strategic Bombing Survey"? It is their postwar analysis on what was accomplished during the campaign, written after examining German documents and interviewing German authorities such as Speer. The document does lean towards awarding more credit to the USAAF than the RAF... a not unexpected bias, but it also details rather objectively how Germany was affected by the campaign. Most of the secondary writings, such as the book you mention, lean heavily on it as a primary source.

I would recommend looking at it, a partial summary can be found here:

http://www.anesi.com/ussbs02.htm#eaocar

Re. destruction of the German Fighter force as primary goal:

The USAAF did have a change of policy regarding how they approached dealing with the German Fighter force when Doolittle replaced Eaker, he did change the Escort's tactics to one of aggressively seeking and pursuing the German fighters, (including ground strafing) as opposed the previous tactic of 'stay with the bombers'. But to suggest the entire bomber force was sent out simply as 'bait' is entirely mistaken. Certainly the USAAF wanted to destroy the Jagdfliegers, the RAF had been trying to destroy it for the previous 4 years, using similar tactics, but unlike the British 'Rodeos' of 1942, which were intended simply to attract and destroy German Fighters... these encompassed a few Blenheims on meaningless raids... escorted by a horde of Spitfires, the USAAF bombers were sent out in large numbers, had definite targets and the intention of destroying them. And the raids did clear damage to German industrial strength. The fact German industrial production peaked during the Strat bombing campaign does not mean the Strat bombing campaign was ineffective, it was more to do with the fact German Industry was managed extremely poorly during the first years of the war, and it wasn't till Speer took control and began to ramp up production and reduce inefficiencies, that production really took off. If the Strat bombing campaign had not existed, German production would have been significantly higher. As it was, because of the shortages of fuel and transportation, German industry ground to a halt in late 1944 and early 1945... without the bombing campaign, this would not have occurred.

Re. 'Bomber' Harris:

Harris had many positive attributes... good organizational skills, good motivational skills, good understanding of tactics and methods, an ability to recognize new technology and adapt it to the RAF. But understanding and analyzing the results of his raids was not one of them. Like the Germans before him, he believed area bombing could accomplish strategic goals. He believed in his concepts of 'de-housing' German workers along with generalized destruction of city infrastructure and factories would result in the industries these workers supported collapsing. He was mistaken.

But Harris was not operating in a vacuum. He was under the supervision and required to act according to the orders of his superiors. And his superiors were not as confident in his area bombing tactics. They insisted he focus his bombers on specific strategic targets as well. For example, prior to D-Day, both the RAF nightbombing force and the USAAF 8th Airforce were diverted on the Joint Chiefs of Staff's orders into a campaign of attacks on Transportation and Transport infrastructure. Area bombing was put on hold for the RAF. And this campaign had an enormous effect on the ability of the Germans to respond to the D-Day invasion... rail transport was basically crippled in France. Reinforcements had to make their way to the front by road, with their limited fuel. And with the Allied Fighter-Bombers patrolling, it meant movement could only really be done at night. To mention one example: The 2nd SS Panzer Division was stationed in Southern France when the invasion happened. Shortly afterwards it was ordered to Normandy. But because no rail transport was available, it took the Division several weeks to arrive instead of one or two days. If the Germans had a functioning rail system in France, the Allies would have had a much more difficult time in Normandy, and could have been outnumbered by arriving German reinforcements during the first few critical weeks.

There numbers of other examples of where Harris was ordered to focus on specific targets... as for example, the fall of 1944, he was ordered to attack the German Synthetic Fuel plants... with the loss of the Rumanian oilfields, these were critical. The RAF's raids on these targets were crucial in reducing fuel output from these plants to a tiny fraction of what they were producing prior to the attacks. These raids led to the final critical shortages of fuel which doomed the German war machine.

And there is the fact even with the area bombing raids, German industry was seriously affected. In centers like Cologne, in the Ruhr industrial belt, the continuous bombing of these areas, meant damage to a large number of factories was a problem the Germans had to deal with on an ongoing basis. And area bombing generally, which it was not as effective, did have a large effect. We know that from what the Germans themselves said at the time. After the bombing of Hamburg, and the firestorms which destroyed a large part of the city, Goebbels called the raids, "... the greatest crisis of the war." Hitler thought a few more raids of this type of result and they would be compelled to surrender.

However, the fact was, the German population was resilient, and were not as badly affected as was feared by the Nazis. Like the British population's response to the German firebombing of Coventry during the Blitz, they refused to give way.

The Nazis started the concept of area bombing, it worked for them in Warsaw and Rotterdam, didn't work during the Blitz. Harris made the mistake of believing in their methods. But his superiors were wise enough to consider other methods.

[TWC_SLAG]

Deighton may have been, as you say, a populist writer. I don't know. But, his fiction book "Bomber" shows a very in-depth knowledge of what was going on in both Bomber Command and Lufwaffe Nightfighter Command.

I don't want to steer anyone away from the focus of the original post. So, I will leave with having just stated my own opinion.

[Perfesser]

I got this as an audio book last year.
Excellent!

[RAF74_Buzzsaw]

Deighton may have been, as you say, a populist writer. I don't know. But, his fiction book "Bomber" shows a very in-depth knowledge of what was going on in both Bomber Command and Lufwaffe Nightfighter Command.

I don't want to steer anyone away from the focus of the original post. So, I will leave with having just stated my own opinion.

Have read 'Bomber'... decent book... yes he understood a lot of what the bomber crews went through.

Difference was it was a piece of fiction, not non-fiction history... higher standard required for non-fiction... factual accuracy is critical.

[Bearfoot]

Buzzsaw,

Thanks for taking the time to provide such a detailed and informative response. Appreciated!

The points you make regarding the USAAF change in policy and the differences in their implementation from the British rodeos, and why success came in one way but not the other etc. are all covered in really fine detail in "To Command the Sky".

I agree, saying the entire bomber force was sent out "simply" as bait is overstating the case!

In fact I think we are basically in complete agreement. The difference might be that you are rejecting my statement of the emphasis of fighter-attrition over infrastructure destruction ... but that might also be because I might be coming across as saying that it was 100% one and 0% the other. I am not! I am saying priority was given to the former. As case in point: routing the ingress over fighter bases instead of undefended areas. So, if you had to give a 30-second elevator pitch summarizing the allied strategy for air war over the Reich, you would not be kicked out of said elevator for saying that in the latter part of said war the daylight bombers were "primarily" bait to lure up German fighters. That is not to say that they did not have a serious or significant effect on infrastructure (they would not have been very good bait if the did NOT).

What references would you recommend for BoB?

[RAF74_Buzzsaw]

Hey Bearfoot

Yes I would agree we have many views in common. :thumbsup:

Re. my favourite history of the BoB... not sure I have one, too often they repeat the same old myths, in particular the one which says if only the Luftwaffe had continued to bomb the Fighter airfields, the battle would have been won... not the case. If the 2nd tier of forward airfields had become too dangerous, then Dowding would have simply re-based his fighters to a fields further back, the same way he did with Hawkinge and Manston earlier in the battle. The forward fields like Biggin Hill would have become 'day fields', temporary landing grounds which rear based fighters could come forward to wait for the call to scramble, the same way as Manston and Hawkinge were used during the battle. All maintenance and 90% of personel would have been rebased to the rear.

Then there is the fact most histories rarely mention the 900 pound gorilla in the room... the Royal Navy. The BoB was all about the Luftwaffe trying to turn the English Channel into a private lake so the Wehrmacht could be ferried across and landed in safety. But easier said than done. All the RAF needed to do was provide cover for the Navy in the approaches to the channel... since the sorties would be timed to allow the cover of darkness when the ships actually entered the channel and made for the landing areas to destroy the troops ships and supply transports. If the Royal Navy was able to get to the landing areas in force on the evening of the invasion day, the entire landing force would be in danger of being isolated and destroyed.

The experience of Narvik in April 1940 during the invasion of Norway made the Wehrmacht very nervous... in that case 10 German Destroyers landed a force of of 1 regiment of mountain troops, approximately 4,000 men... but the Royal Navy then arrived, sank all the destroyers, and isolated the German troops. If it wasn't for the fact the Germans had a much larger force advancing up the roads from Oslo in southern Norway, the troops which landed at Narvik would likely have all been captured. Something on a larger scale was a likely result if the Royal Navy got loose off a newly formed beachhead in southern England. The Royal Navy was able to do the damage at Narvik despite not having any airbases to speak of. In southern England, the RAF could hold back its fighters if need be, till they were needed, then commit them to forward bases to provide the air cover allow a successful Royal Navy sortie. The potential for tens of thousands of dead, drowning or captured Wehrmacht troops was the key reason Hitler and his army commanders got cold feet.

I would say I prefer books which focus in more detail on specific sections of the battle rather than general histories which don't get too specific. For example, I like the detail and focus of "The Hardest Day" by Alfred Price, which focuses in on the events of August 19th, the day when the most losses were suffered on both sides. Combine those types of readings with a copy of "The Battle of Britain: A Day-by-Day Chronology" by John G. Bentley, which lists the events day by day and you have a start. I also like less well known books like "The Luftwaffe Fighters' Battle of Britain: The Inside Story November 1940-may 1941" by Chris Goss, because it provides a view of the battle which is too often lacking in the predominantly British focused histories.


Buzzsaw,

Thanks for taking the time to provide such a detailed and informative response. Appreciated!

The points you make regarding the USAAF change in policy and the differences in their implementation from the British rodeos, and why success came in one way but not the other etc. are all covered in really fine detail in "To Command the Sky".

I agree, saying the entire bomber force was sent out "simply" as bait is overstating the case!

In fact I think we are basically in complete agreement. The difference might be that you are rejecting my statement of the emphasis of fighter-attrition over infrastructure destruction ... but that might also be because I might be coming across as saying that it was 100% one and 0% the other. I am not! I am saying priority was given to the former. As case in point: routing the ingress over fighter bases instead of undefended areas. So, if you had to give a 30-second elevator pitch summarizing the allied strategy for air war over the Reich, you would not be kicked out of said elevator for saying that in the latter part of said war the daylight bombers were "primarily" bait to lure up German fighters. That is not to say that they did not have a serious or significant effect on infrastructure (they would not have been very good bait if the did NOT).

What references would you recommend for BoB?

[ATAG_Flare]

Hi Bearfoot!

If you're looking for the "definitive" Battle of Britain, I suggest "The Most Dangerous Enemy" by Stephen Bungay. Really an exceptional read, along with "The Hardest Day".

Flare

[TWC_SLAG]

Have read 'Bomber'... decent book... yes he understood a lot of what the bomber crews went through.

Difference was it was a piece of fiction, not non-fiction history... higher standard required for non-fiction... factual accuracy is critical.

I have to disagree, in this particular case. Certainly, the people and events are fiction. But, the technical details are every bit as accurate as any non-fiction book would contain. This allows the reader to learn about the way actual events happened, as the depth of research was the same.

[ATAG_Flare]

For example, I like the detail and focus of "The Hardest Day" by Alfred Price, which focuses in on the events of August 19th, the day when the most losses were suffered on both sides.

August 18th ;)

[RAF74_Buzzsaw]

August 18th ;)

You're right! Writing a PM off the top of my head instead of having the book at hand. :doh:

[Bearfoot]

Thanks for the recommendations on the BoB books, Buzzsaw and Flare.

Adding to my "to read" list.

And Buzzsaw: you have removed some decades-old curtains from my eyes! Yes, ever since I was old enough to read about the BoB, I have learned and believed those myths: the famous bomb jettison incident leading to the revenge raid leading to the strategic error of targets shifting from airfields to cities leading to Luftwaffe losing the battle. But, of course, what you say re: primary and secondary airfields makes sense. However, if the objective had been (or remained) the radar stations, assuming that eventually the importance of this was recognized ... that would have made a difference in favor of the Luftwaffe, no, given that these were crucial force multipliers in allowing incredibly well-managed feeding in and direction of the fighters? Of course, as you say, even if the RAF were broken in the battle, the Royal Navy remained to make Sealion very risky ...

[ATAG_((dB))]

You're right! Writing a PM off the top of my head instead of having the book at hand. :doh:

First sign of aging Buzz ;)