Jabos

[Yo-Yo]

(Considering 109s only) Were Jabo missions only flown by dedicated squadrons, or did 'normal' JG 109 squadrons ever find themselves having to drop bombs inbetween their regular escort/patrol/sweep type missions?

[DerDa]

As far as I remember from Galland's memoirs from the Channel front, the regular fighters were forced to 'Dödelschleppen' duty as a kind of punishment by Göring ("If they are not able to protect our bombers, they have to carry the bombs themselves!")
They truly hated it, because flying low they lost one of the main advantages of the 109.
They also did not receive any real training (and had no bombsights anyway), so (again according to Galland) they dropped their bombs anywhere and anyhow just to get rid of them.

Later the extremely low flying 190's where more of a nuisance, but still it was a very costly undertaking to very little effect.

Even in late war the situation was much the same. Meimberg relates an event, when his 109 flight was forced to bomb the Remagen bridge, without training, resulting in heavy losses and no effect at all.

[Yo-Yo]

As far as I remember from Galland's memoirs from the Channel front, the regular fighters were forced to 'Dödelschleppen' duty as a kind of punishment by Göring ("If they are not able to protect our bombers, they have to carry the bombs themselves!")
They truly hated it, because flying low they lost one of the main advantages of the 109.
They also did not receive any real training (and had no bombsights anyway), so (again according to Galland) they dropped their bombs anywhere and anyhow just to get rid of them.

Later the extremely low flying 190's where more of a nuisance, but still it was a very costly undertaking to very little effect.

Even in late war the situation was much the same. Meimberg relates an event, when his 109 flight was forced to bomb the Remagen bridge, without training, resulting in heavy losses and no effect at all.

Thanks, that's very useful. Much appreciated.

[RAF74_Buzzsaw]

The "LG" Gruppes and Staffels were the designated ground attack units during the Battle of Britain. These were mixed units, so they had both Bf-110's and Bf-109's. These used the Bf-109E-3B/E-4B's mostly.

Later in the war, the regular Geschwader/Gruppes had designated Staffels which were tasked with ground attack... usually the 4th Staffel in a Gruppe did this. This was a typical organization in the Desert and for the units based in Sicily. The lower numbered Staffels flew Bf-109F's... the ground attack Staffels flew Bf-109E-7's.

Later again, you had a re-organization with the 'Schlactgeschwader'... which were entire Geschwaders entirely focused on ground attack.

[IIJG27Rich]

My favorite Jabo picture that I have. Funny because it's my birthday too..not the year

[Yo-Yo]

The "LG" Gruppes and Staffels were the designated ground attack units during the Battle of Britain. These were mixed units, so they had both Bf-110's and Bf-109's. These used the Bf-109E-3B/E-4B's mostly.

Later in the war, the regular Geschwader/Gruppes had designated Staffels which were tasked with ground attack... usually the 4th Staffel in a Gruppe did this. This was a typical organization in the Desert and for the units based in Sicily. The lower numbered Staffels flew Bf-109F's... the ground attack Staffels flew Bf-109E-7's.

Later again, you had a re-organization with the 'Schlactgeschwader'... which were entire Geschwaders entirely focused on ground attack.

Excellent, thanks.

[LARRY69]

My favorite Jabo picture that I have. Funny because it's my birthday too..not the year

[IIJG27Rich]

WOW beautiful. If I remember this pilot was quite a danger. I think I have a picture of him in the water being rescued and another in a hospital somewhere in my files. When I think for a moment a small 109 skimming across the sea would be hard to see if it were doing a skip bomb attack but I have no idea if that's the way they did it or not.

[IIJG27Rich]

There he is. If we ever get dinghys-life rafts here's one as a reference what one would look like for a 109 pilot




A little more info too but sadly you have to be a redit member to get the image out of the way

https://www.reddit.com/r/wwiipics/co...mo_edp=enabled

[IIJG27Rich]

I'm just curious now. Does anyone know where his dinghy would be stored? I was thinking the cubbyhole behind the headrest?

[Yo-Yo]

I'm just curious now. Does anyone know where his dinghy would be stored? I was thinking the cubbyhole behind the headrest?

My guess, and simply just that, a guess, is the larger storage where the Cross is on the fuselage?

That is ripped off on this image:

https://previews.agefotostock.com/pr...v-11951312.jpg

Edit: But yes that cubby would make more sense.

https://imgur.com/4VsxxvG

[IIJG27Rich]

I was thinking that too. I think there is a first aid kit in there not positive though. As far as the dinghy goes I would think you'd want it all ready to inflate before you hit the water. Blow the canopy and chuck it out just before you hit the water if you can keep yourself together and think fast enough. HEY!! This all sounds like a heck of a lot of fun..You guys have to add it to the game lolol. Movies are movies so I don't know if this is how it was in real life with Spitfires but in Dark Blue World a Spitfire pilot chucks his dinghy out of the cockpit to his mate who is stuck in the channel after being shot down.

[major_setback]

They sat on it in Spitfires at least, according to this:

https://ww2aircraft.net/forum/thread...2/post-1624298


" .... after the losses of pilots during the BoB, who bailed out into the English Channel, and were either drowned or died due to hypothermia, before rescue was possible, "K2" Type dinghies were eventually issued, starting I believe in early to mid 1941.
This was clipped to the "seat" of the parachute harness, between the cushion of the seat-type parachute pack, and the wearer, who effectively sat on the rather hard dinghy pack."

[Yo-Yo]

Makes sense to have it simlar to the spitfire.

I would have thoguht my theory of it being in the side means 99% of the time if you ditch in water you don't really have much of a chance to get there and retreive anything before the big heavy lump of aircraft sinks.

I would have thought the cubbyhole would be better, but, if bailing rather than ditching, it would be pretty hard to open it up and get anything out whilst you'd just let go of the controls and you're in the airflow? But if you'd ditched it would probably be significantly easier to open that up before leaping out.

SO, yep the suggestion in that link makes good sense.

Interesting question though.

[major_setback]

If you damage the in-game Martlet in the right place you can see the dinghy when the cover is blown off.
It's behind the pilot on the outer starboard side, if I remember correctly.

[IIJG27Rich]

Found this

[DerDa]

I found the pages written by Galland in his memoirs and attach them here, together with an English translation.

From this it becomes clear, that the 'Jabos' (converted Bf 109s during the BoB, and that was what the original question was about) were something different from the "Schlachtflieger" (ground attack squadrons, equipped with Stukas, Bf 110 and later Fw 190s).

The tactic emloyed was not low level attacks and dive bombing (as in the beautiful picture above) but instead level bombing from 6000 m altitude without bomb sights.

Enjoy the reading!

S!

DerDa

Zwischen der vierten Phase der Schlacht um England, die mit der Einstellung der Tages-Bombenangriffe am 20. Oktober zu Ende ging, und der fünften und zugleich letzten, während welcher die Ziele auf der britischen Insel bei Nacht bombardiert wurden, liegt der Einsatz der deutschen Jagdbomber, ein Novum in der Geschichte des Luftkrieges. Ist der Schlachtflieger, der sozusagen als „fliegender Stoßtrupp“ im Tiefflug Stellungen und Truppenbewegungen im Frontnahen Raum mit Bomben, Raketen und Bordwaffen bekämpft, eine ausschließlich taktische Waffe zur Unterstützung des Heeres, so fallen dem Jagdbomber, der weit hinter dem Schlachtfeld gegen Erdziele eingesetzt wird, Aufgaben zu, deren Erfüllung im Rahmen strategischer Luftoperationen von erheblicher Bedeutung sein kann. Das sollte sich besonders deutlich zeigen, als der Jagdbomber auch auf alliierter Seite, bei der Luftoffensive gegen das Reich, eingesetzt wurde. Die zahllosen, von amerikanischen Jabos zersiebten Lokomotiven, auf dem westdeutschen Eisenbahnnetz gegen Ende des Krieges legten davon ein beredtes Zeugnis ab.
Die Jagdbomber-Idee hatte auf deutscher Seite anderen Ursprung. Der Jäger wurde nicht etwa nach Erfüllung seiner ursprünglichen Aufgabe im „Krieg in der Luft“, also nach Erringung einer ausreichenden Luftüberlegenheit, als zusätzliche Waffe im „Krieg aus der Luft“ eingesetzt, – er musste als Jagdbomber gewissermaßen den „Lückenbüßer und Sündenbock“ spielen. Man ging von der Überlegung aus, dass die Bomber offenbar von der Jagdwaffe nicht ausreichend geschützt werden konnten. Das stimmte wohl. Statt nun aber die für diese Tatsache gegebenen Erklärungen der Front zu akzeptieren und die Ursachen dafür nach Möglichkeit zu beseitigen, oder – als Alternative – die nicht mehr vertretbaren Angriffe einzustellen, schlussfolgerte man so: gut, die Jäger haben sich als unfähig erwiesen, die Bomber zu schützen. Dann sollen sie die Bomben eben selbst nach England tragen.
So packt der Tor ein Schwert, das im Kampf schartig geworden ist, statt es zu schärfen, am verkehrten Ende, um mit dem stumpfen Knauf auf den Gegner einzuschlagen. Auch politisch-propagandistische Gründe mögen die Führung zu dieser Fehlentscheidung bewogen haben. – Die Bombenangriffe auf England waren zu einer Prestige-Frage geworden. Bei Tage konnte man sie mit Bombern nicht mehr fortsetzen. Nacht-Einsätze wurden erst vorbereitet. Diese Lücke sollten nun die in Jagdbomber verwandelten Jäger ausfüllen. Nicht militärische Notwendigkeiten, sondern politische Augenblicksforderungen bestimmten den Jabo-Einsatz. Statt das erstrebte Ziel, den Bombenkrieg gegen England, für den eine ausreichende Luftüberlegenheit unerlässlich war, durch eine forcierte Verstärkung der Jagdwaffe möglich zu machen, schwächte man diese durch Umwandlung von Jagdflugzeugen in Bombenträger. Der operative Wert von Jagdbombern ist unbestreitbar unter der Voraussetzung, dass ein Überschuss an Jägern vorhanden ist. Den Jäger aber als Jagdbomber einzusetzen, wenn die Jagdkräfte ohnehin schon nicht zur Erringung der Luftüberlegenheit ausreichen, heißt das Pferd am Schwanz aufzuzäumen.
Es fing mit der sogenannten Erprobungsgruppe 210 an, die mit Me 109, Me 110 und Me 210 ausgerüstet war. Sie wurde gegen Mitte September in den Pas de Calais verlegt und dem Begleitschutz meines Geschwaders anvertraut. Gleichzeitig erhielten die sieben in der Schlacht um England eingesetzten Jagdgeschwader den Befehl, je eine Gruppe oder bei jeder Gruppe eine Staffel, das heißt also ein Drittel auf Jagdbomber umzurüsten.
Wir Jagdflieger sahen dieser Vergewaltigung unserer Maschinen erbittert zu.Wir hatten alles getan, um ihre Flugeigenschaften gegenüber dem immer besser werdenden Gegner zu steigern. Wir hatten, um nur noch einen einzigen Kilometer an Höchstgeschwindigkeit mehr herauszukitzeln, alles Entbehrliche herausgeworfen. Wir hatten immer wieder Zusatztanks zur Erhöhung unserer Eindringtiefe verlangt. Statt ihrer bekamen wir jetzt Bombenabwurfvorrichtungen, und mussten erleben, dass ein Drittel der Maschinen für den Luftkampf ausfiel.
Der Einsatz der neuen Jabos erfolgte überstürzt. Für eine Ausbildung blieb kaum Zeit. Die meisten Flugzeugführer warfen die erste scharfe Bombe ihres Lebens im Einsatz über London oder anderen Zielenin England. Insgesamt hatte wir damals etwa 250 Jabos. Die Me 109 trug eine Sprengbombe von 250 kg, insgesamt also 700 kg. Damit war keine nachhaltige Wirkung zu erzielen. Um so weniger als die über das „Dödelschleppen“ verbitterten Jäger froh waren, wenn sie die Bombe irgendwie los wurden.
Die Durchführung der Jabo-Angriffe erfolgte so, dass jedes Geschwader den Jagdschutz für die eigenen Bombenträger stellte. Die Anflughöhe lag, im Verband gestaffelt, bei etwa 6000 Meter. Zunächst ließen wir die Jabos wie einen zu schützenden Bomberverband geschlossen fliegen. Es stellte sich aber bald heraus, dass die englischen Jäger sich so ganz gegen die Bombenträger konzentrieren konnten. Wir verteilten daher die Jabos in kleinsten Einheiten auf den gesamten Geschwaderverband und brachten sie so einigermaßen sicher über die Zielräume. Dieser Art von Angriffen kam aber nicht mehr als die Bedeutung von ungezielten Störangriffen zu. Ds passive Verhalten dabei gegenüber der Jagdabwehr und das kämpferische Unterlegenheitsgefühl bei gegnerischen Angriffen aufgrund der Einbuße an Geschwindigkeit, Wendigkeit und Steigfähigkeit und schließlich die keineswegs überzeugende Wirkung seiner einzeln ins Gelände gekleckerten Bombenverdarben die damals durch die Begleitschutzaufträge ohnehin schon reichlich strapazierte Moral des deutschen Jagdfliegers.
Wir gingen unwillig und mit ausgesprochener Antipathie an die Jabo-Aufträge heran. Die Luftwaffenführung trat unserer negativen Eistellung mit aller Schärfe entgegen. Göring erklärte in heftigem Ton, dass die Jagdwaffe bei ihren Begleitschutzaufträgen für die Bombergeschwader versagt habe und jetzt gegen die Jabo-Einsätze opponiere, die sie doch nur ihrem eigenen Versagen zuzuschreiben habe. Wenn sie sich auch für diese Aufgabe als unfähig erwiese, wäre es das beste, die Jagdwaffe überhaupt aufzulösen.

Aus: Adolf Galland, Die Ersten und die Letzen. Sonderausgabe für Flechsig-Buchvertrieb, Verlagshaus Würzburg, 2007 [1953], 109–111.


Between the fourth phase of the Battle of Britain, which ended with the cessation of daytime bombing on October 20th, and the fifth and last phase, during which the targets on the British Isles were bombed at night, lies the use of German fighter-bombers, a novelty in the history of air warfare. Whereas the ground attack aircraft (“Schlachtflieger”), which acts as a "flying shock troop" that fights positions and troop movements in the area close to the front with bombs, rockets and airborne weapons, is an exclusively tactical weapon to support the army, the fighter-bomber, which is deployed far behind the battlefield against ground targets, is assigned tasks whose fulfilment can be of considerable importance within the framework of strategic air operations. This was to become particularly obvious when the fighter-bomber was also used on the Allied side, in the air offensive against the Reich. The countless locomotives sifted to pieces by American Jabos on the West German railway network towards the end of the war bore eloquent witness to this.
The fighter-bomber idea had a different origin on the German side. The fighter was not used as an additional weapon in the "war from the air" after fulfilling its original task in the "war in the air", i.e. after achieving sufficient air superiority, instead it had to play the "stopgap and scapegoat" role, so to speak. The assumption was that the bombers obviously could not be sufficiently protected by the fighters. That was true. But instead of accepting the explanations given by the front for this fact and eliminating the causes for it as far as possible, or – as an alternative – stopping the attacks that were no longer justifiable, it was concluded: well, the fighters have proved incapable of protecting the bombers. Then let them carry the bombs to England themselves.
Thus, instead of sharpening a sword that has become chipped in battle, the fool grabs it by the wrong end to strike at the enemy with the blunt pommel. Political-propagandistic reasons may also have led the leadership to this wrong decision. – The bombing of England had become a matter of prestige. They could no longer be continued by day with bombers.
Night missions were only being prepared. This gap was now to be filled by the fighters transformed into fighter-bombers. Not military necessities, but political momentary demands determined the Jabo deployment. Instead of making the desired goal, the bombing war against England, for which sufficient air superiority was indispensable, possible through a forced reinforcement of the fighter force, it was weakened by converting fighter planes into bomb carriers. The operational value of fighter-bombers is indisputable, provided that there is a surplus of fighters. But to use the fighter as a fighter-bomber when the fighter forces are already insufficient to achieve air superiority is to put the cart before the horse.
It started with the so-called Erprobungsgruppe 210, which was equipped with Me 109s, Me 110s and Me 210s. It was transferred to the Pas de Calais around mid-September and entrusted to the escort of my squadron. At the same time, the seven fighter squadrons engaged in the Battle of Britain were ordered to convert one group or one squadron in each group, i.e. one third, to fighter-bombers.
We fighter pilots watched this rape of our machines with bitterness. We had done everything we could to improve their flying qualities against the ever-improving enemy. We had thrown out everything that was dispensable in order to gain just one more kilometre of top speed. We had repeatedly demanded drop-tanks to increase our penetration depth. Instead, we now got bombing equipment, and had to experience that a third of the machines were out of action for air combat.
The deployment of the new Jabos was rushed. There was hardly any time for training. Most pilots dropped the first live bomb of their lives over London or other targets in England. We had a total of about 250 Jabos at that time. The Me 109 carried an explosive bomb of 250 kg, making a total of 700 kg. It was impossible to achieve a lasting effect with this. All the less so because the fighters, embittered by the "Dödelschleppen” (putz dragging), were glad to get rid of the bomb somehow.
The Jabo attacks were carried out in such a way that each squadron provided fighter protection for its own bomb carriers. The approach altitude, staggered in the formation, was about 6000 metres. At first, we let the Jabos fly together like a bomber group to be protected. But it soon turned out that the British fighters could concentrate completely against the bomb carriers. We therefore distributed the Jabos in smallest units over the entire squadron and thus brought them over the target areas reasonably safely. This type of attack, however, had no more significance than that of an untargeted jamming attack. The passive role against fighter defence and the feeling of inferiority in the face of enemy attacks due to the loss of speed, manoeuvrability and climbing ability, and finally the by no means convincing effect of a few bombs blotted out individually into the terrain, spoiled the morale of the German fighter pilots, which at that time was already strained to the hilt by the escort missions.
We approached the Jabo missions unwillingly and with marked antipathy. The Luftwaffe leadership countered our negative attitude with all severity. Göring declared in a vehement tone that the fighters had failed in their escort missions for the bomber squadrons and were now opposing the Jabo missions, which they could only blame on their own failure. If it proved incapable of this task as well, the best thing would be to disband the Jagdwaffe altogether.

Aus: Adolf Galland, Die Ersten und die Letzen. Sonderausgabe für Flechsig-Buchvertrieb, Verlagshaus Würzburg, 2007 [1953], 109–111.
Translated with DeepL free version, corrected by DerDa.

[major_setback]

If you damage the in-game Martlet in the right place you can see the dinghy when the cover is blown off.
It's behind the pilot on the outer starboard side, if I remember correctly.

Dinghy on the Martlet.

WiP posted during creation of the Martlet by the 3D modeller.

RibsMartleta.jpg

1459311257881.jpg

[LARRY69]

Found this

LARRY69